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INTRODUCTION
In the 2004 election, 527 political organizations' emerged from
the fringes of the American election system to become defining and
dominating players in a close electoral contest.2 The names of these
organizations were just as familiar as the candidates themselves:
MoveOn.org, Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, The Media Fund, and
Progress for America Voter Fund, to name a few.' Unlike the
candidates, these organizations operated with few restraints on
their financial ability to affect the outcome of the 2004 election.4 As
a result, 527 political organizations produced and disseminated
communications that defined and dominated the 2004 election.5
Their political communications were often the most "hard-hitting
and misleading" of the campaign.6 To protect the integrity of our
election system, reform is needed.
The 527 political organizations achieved their dominance by
raising and spending "soft money." The term soft money denotes
unlimited monetary contributions provided by a single source that
is given outside the reach of federal campaign finance law.' In the
1. The 627 political organizations are formed for the specific purpose of influencing
elections; they are organized under section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code. See infra notes
80-83 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra Part II.A.
2. See Mark Hosenball, Michael Isikoff & Holly Bailey, The Secret Money War,
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 20, 2004, at 22, 23; Colleen McCain Nelson, 527s Adding Cash, Clout to
Campaign, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 18, 2004, at 1A; The Center for Public Integrity,
527s in 2004 Shatter Previous Records for Political Fundraising, Dec. 16, 2004, http://
www.public-i.org/527/report.aspx?aid=435. An example of the defining and dominating role
played by 527s in the 2004 election was the ability of the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, a
527 political organization, to negatively impact presidential candidate John Kerry's poll
numbers during the summer of 2004. Hosenball, Isikoff & Bailey, supra, at 22, 23; Nelson,
supra.
3. See generally Nelson, supra note 2 (reporting the significance of the fact that voters
no longer need an explanation of 527 organizations).
4. See infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
5. See generally Howard Kurtz, Ads Aiming Straight for the Heart, WASH. POST, Oct.
27, 2004, at Al (describing various 527 organizations that were active in the 2004 election).
6. Id. (quoting Brown University Professor Darrell West).
7. Richard Briffault, McConnell v. FEC and the Transformation of Campaign Finance
Law, 3 ELECTION L.J. 147, 150 (2004). "Soft money" is everything that is not "hard money."
"Hard money" refers to monetary contributions made to federal candidates or political
parties for the purpose of "expressly advocating the election or defeat of federal candidates"
and is limited by federal election law. Id. For a discussion on the hard money limits, see infra
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2004 election, 527 political organizations received more than $400
million.' The soft money was raised from individuals, corporations,
and labor unions interested in a specific electoral outcome. The
most generous of these contributors made donations ranging from
$3.9 million to $30 million.9 Their contributions funded television
advertising, partisan voter registration, and partisan get-out-the-
vote efforts. 10
The emergence of these 527 political organizations was a direct
result of the enactment of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002 (BCRA).1" BCRA sought to eliminate single-source contribu-
tions that ran into the hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars
Part I.A.
8. See The Center for Public Integrity, 2003-04 National or Federal Race 527 Activity
[hereinafter Center for Public Integrity, 527 Activity], http://www.publicintegrity.org/527/
db.aspx?act=nact (last visited Aug. 19, 2005) (listing the contributions and expenditures for
527s engaged in electioneering activity); see also The Center for Responsive Politics, 527
Committee Activity: Top 50 Federally Focused Organizations, http://www.opensecrets.org/
527s/527cmtes.asp?level=C&cycle=2004 (last visited Aug. 19, 2005) (providing a list of
contributions and expenditures for the top fifty 527s). The soft money raised by 527 political
organizations would have been much higher if the Republicans had not delayed their efforts
to solicit soft money through 527 political committees until the summer of 2004. See Thomas
B. Edsall, After Late Start, Republican Groups Jump into the Lead. Since August, 527s
Raised Six Times as Much as Democrats, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2004, at A15. Republicans
delayed solicitation to pursue efforts to have soft money fundraising by 527 political
committees deemed illegal. See id. Democrats began laying the groundwork for raising soft
money through 527s in 2003. See James V. Grimaldi & Thomas B. Edsall, Super Rich Step
into Political Vacuum: McCain-Feingold Paved Way for 527s, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2004, at
Al.
9. The Center for Responsive Politics, Top Contributors to 527 Committees, 2004
Election Cycle [hereinafter Center for Responsive Politics, Contributors], http://www.
opensecrets.org/527s/527contribs.asp?cycle=2004 (last visited Aug. 19, 2005). Generous
individuals donated up to $23 million. The Center for Responsive Politics, Top Individual
Contributors to 527 Committees, 2004 Election Cycle [hereinafter Center for Responsive
Politics, Individual], http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527indivs. asp?cycle=2004 (last visited
Aug. 19, 2005).
10. Dan Balz & Thomas B. Edsall, Democrats Forming Parallel Campaign: Interest
Groups Draw GOP Fire, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2004, at Al.
11. See Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-442 (2002)). BCRA
amended the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972)
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-442) (2002 amendments to be codified at 2 U.S.C. §§
431-442), which governs campaign finance contributions and other aspects of the federal
election system. 116 Stat. at 81. BCRA is also commonly referred to as McCain-Feingold, the
names of the two key Senators who sponsored the legislation. Craig Holman, The Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act: Limits and Opportunities for Non-Profit Groups in Federal Elections,
31 N. KY. L. REV. 243, 243-44 (2004).
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by restricting the ability of political parties to raise soft money to
influence federal elections. 2 Prior to BCRA, soft money contribu-
tions were channeled through the national political parties. 1
3
Stymied by BCRA's ban, the political parties sought a new method
of raising soft money.14 They turned to 527 political organizations.'"
The 527 political organizations are independent groups 6 organized
for the primary purpose of influencing elections.' Operating as
independent groups, 527 political organizations may exist beyond
the reach of hard money limits.'" Thus, they are able to raise soft
money in order to try to influence the outcome of federal elections.' 9
Reform legislation was introduced in 2004 to stop the circumven-
tion of BCRA's intent and protect the integrity of the American
election system by closing this 527 soft money loophole.2" The
legislation proposed bringing 527 political organizations that
promote, attack, support, or oppose an identified federal candidate
within the scope of the hard money limits.2' Although this legisla-
tion was not acted on in the 108th Congress, congressional cam-
paign reform advocates continued their efforts to close the loophole
12. See Press Release, Senator John McCain, McCain Lauds Senate Passage of
Landmark Campaign Finance Reform Bill (Mar. 20, 2002), available at http://mccain.
senate.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=Newscenter.ViewPressRelease&Contentid=324 ("We all
recognized one very simple truth: that campaign contributions from a single source that run
to the hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars are not healthy to a democracy."); infra
notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Part I.C.
14. See Balz & Edsall, supra note 10; Edsall, supra note 8.
15. See Balz & Edsall, supra note 10; Edsall, supra note 8.
16. "Independent groups may make unlimited 'independent expenditures' in connection
with federal elections." FED. ELECTION COMM'N, THE FEC AND THE FEDERAL CAMPAIGN
FINANCE LAW 4-5 (2004), available at
http://www.fec.gov/pageslbrochuresfec-fecabrochure.pdf(lastvisitedAug. 19,2005). Groups
maintain their independent status by not making political communications in "cooperation,
consultation or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, any candidate or his/her
authorized committees, or a political party." Id. If a political communication is coordinated
with a candidate, political committee, or political party, then it is considered a direct
contribution subject to the applicable contribution limit. See Kenneth Gross, The New
Federal Campaign Finance Act-In a Nutshell, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS, July 2002, at 25.
17. See infra Part II.A.
18. See infra Part II.B.
19. See infra Part I.B.
20. See Helen Dewar, Bill Would Curb '527' Spending: No Action Expected Before
Elections, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2004, at A27.
21. See infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text; infra Part III.
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by introducing similar legislation in the next congressional
session.12 This Note examines whether the basic framework
proposed in the reform legislation is constitutional. Part I provides
an overview of federal campaign finance law. Part II summarizes
the history of 527 political organizations and their role in the
American election system. Part III discusses the basic framework
of the proposed reform legislation and the constitutional arguments
leveled against it. Part -V examines the constitutionality of
bringing 527 political organizations within the scope of the federal
hard money limits. This Note concludes that the basic framework
of the proposed legislation provides a constitutional reform of the
election system, a reform that will protect the integrity of the
system from wealthy individuals seeking to influence the outcome
of an election for their favored candidate.
I. OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW
A. Current Federal Campaign Finance Law
The financing of federal elections is governed by the Federal
Election Campaign Act (FECA).23 FECA was enacted in response to
the concern that large monetary contributions were being made to
influence elections and secure political favors.24 To help maintain
the integrity of the election system, FECA limits contributions to
federal candidates and requires public disclosure of funds raised
22. 527 Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 513, 109th Cong. (2005); 527 Reform Act of 2005, S. 271,
109th Cong. (2005). The Senate Committee on Rules and Administration sought comment
on S. 271 during a hearing on March 8, 2005. See Hearing to Examine and Discuss S.271, A
Bill Which Reforms the Regulatory and Reporting Structure of Organizations Registered
Under Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code Before the S. Comm. on Rules and
Administration, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter 527 Hearing], available at http:Ilrules.
senate.gov/hearings/ 2005/030805_hearing.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2005). Efforts to apply
hard money limits to certain 527 political organization activities gained the support of
President Bush and Senator Trent Lott, who originally opposed BCRA. Glen Justice, McCain
Calls for New Limits on Money to Political Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2005, at A14.
23. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-442)
(2002 amendments to be codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-442).
24. See Bryan R. Whittaker, Note, A Legislative Strategy Conditioned on Corruption:
Regulating Campaign Financing After McConnell v. FEC, 79 IND. L.J. 1063, 1068-71 (2004)
(reviewing the history of FECA's enactment and the actual and perceived corruption that
propelled its enactment and subsequent amendment).
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and spent to influence federal elections.25 The application of FECA
varies depending on the actor and the type of electioneering
activity.26
Under FECA's requirements, federal candidate committees, party
committees, political committees,2 7 and certain independent groups
must disclose contributions and expenditures of more than $200.28
Independent groups who spend more than $10,000 airing television
ads that can be received by 50,000 or more persons in the federal
candidate's district thirty days before a primary election or sixty
days before a general election must disclose contributions of more
than $1000 and expenditures of more than $200.29 Public disclosure
is achieved by filing periodic reports with the Federal Election
Commission (FEC).3 ° The FEC then makes these disclosures
available to the public.31
FECA's hard money limits are based on the recipient's classifica-
tion. A federal candidate's committee is limited to receiving $2100
per election from an individual. 2 Federal committees run by
national parties are limited to receiving $26,700 per election from
individuals; state and local party federal committees are limited to
$10,000. 33 Political committees are limited to receiving $5000 per
election from individuals. 34 Additionally, individuals may give up to
$101,400 in federal contributions every two years. 5 FECA also
25. FED. ELECTION COMM'N, supra note 16, at 2, 4.
26. See id.
27. Political committees are organizations formed for the major purpose of influencing
elections; their expenditures are used for political communications that expressly advocate
the election or defeat of a clearly identified federal candidate. See infra notes 48-51 and
accompanying text. For additional discussion on the political committee definition, see infra
Part II.B.
28. FED. ELECTION COMM'N, supra note 16, at 4. Prior to the enactment of BCRA,
independent groups were not required to disclose money they raised and spent. After BCRA,
they must only disclose if they engage in electioneering communication. See infra Part I.B-C.
29. Gross, supra note 16, at 24.
30. DonaldJ. Simon, Current Regulation and Future Challenges for Campaign Financing
in the United States, 3 ELECTION L.J. 474, 475 (2004).
31. Id.
32. FED. ELECTION COMM'N, supra note 16, at 6-7. This hard money limit is increased for
inflation in odd-numbered years. Id.
33. Id. The national political party hard money limit is also increased for inflation in odd-
numbered years. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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prohibits corporations, labor organizations, government contrac-
tors, and foreign nationals from contributing funds or expenditures
to influence federal elections.36 Independent groups such as 527
political organizations are not subject to any of these contribution
limits unless their activities qualify them as a political committee.3 v
B. First Attempt to Limit Contributions to Certain Independent
Groups
With FECA, Congress originally sought to bring certain inde-
pendent groups within the scope of the political committee contribu-
tion limits. To do so, Congress created a very broad definition for
the term "political committee." Under the definition, an independ-
ent group would be considered a political committee if it 'receives
contributions or makes expenditures during a calendar year in an
aggregate amount exceeding $1000."'38
This attempt to capture independent groups within federal
campaign finance law was challenged as an unconstitutional
infringement on First Amendment rights.39 The Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of the political committee defini-
tion under strict scrutiny review because of the First Amendment
implications.4 ° The Court held that the government had a compel-
ling interest in enacting FECA-preventing corruption and the
appearance of corruption in the election system.41 This compelling
interest was derived from the risk to the election system presented
by the mere possibility of giving federal candidates unlimited
36. Id. at 4.
37. See infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
38. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 n.105 (1976) (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 431(d)).
39. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 11. The challengers included Senator James L. Buckley of New
York, Eugene McCarthy (presidential candidate and former senator from Minnesota), the
Conservative Party of the State of New York, the Mississippi Republican Party, the
Libertarian Party, the New York Civil Liberties Union, the American Conservative Union,
the Conservative Victory Fund, and Human Events. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 8; see also Federal
Election Commission, The Federal Election Campaign Laws:A Short History, http://www.fec.
gov/info/appfour.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2005).
40. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25, 64 (describing the review as'"closest scrutiny"' and "exacting
scrutiny" (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958))).
41. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-29.
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campaign contributions in exchange for political favors. 42 The Court
did not agree, however, that the political committee definition was
sufficiently narrow to achieve this compelling interest.43
The Court determined that the political committee definition
could be construed so broadly that it would unconstitutionally
infringe on the First Amendment rights of independent groups.44
The Court found that independent groups were vital participants in
the discussion of public issues and in the debate on the qualifica-
tions of candidates. 45 The Court believed that this role was vital to
the operation of the American system of government. 4' Thus, the
Court stated: 'The First Amendment affords the broadest protection
to such political expression in order 'to assure [the] unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people.' 47
Rather than invalidate the political committee definition, the
Court narrowed its breadth by providing a new definition.4" The
Court stated that an independent group does not fall within the
political committee definition unless its major purpose is to
influence elections and it makes expenditures in an aggregate
amount exceeding $1000 "for communications that expressly
advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate."49
42. See Whittaker, supra note 24, at 1073. For example, corruption involving monetary
contributions in the early 1970s included bribes, money laundering, and efforts to circumvent
the spirit of FECA before the law took effect. See id. at 1069-70, 1074. Wittaker also
discusses the savings and loan industry's use of large contributions to members of Congress
to curry favor for deregulating the industry during the 1980s. See id. at 1064-65.
43. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 78-80; see also Briffault, supra note 7, at 155 (stating that the
Court recognized that FECA's political committee definition could be interpreted to apply to
groups engaged solely in issue advocacy); Craig Holman & Joan Claybrook, Outside Groups
in the New Campaign Finance Environment: The Meaning of BCRA and the McConnell
Decision, 22 YALE L. & POLY REV. 235, 239 (2004) (stating that the Court found FECA's
language-which regulated expenditures by parties and groups regarding a "clearly
identified candidate"-to be overly broad).
44. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79.
45. See id. at 14.
46. See id.
47. Id. (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
48. Briffault, supra note 7, at 155; Holman & Claybrook, supra note 43, at 239.
49. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79-80; see also Holman & Claybrook, supra note 43, at 239-40
(explaining the Court's reinterpretation of the political committee definition). The Buckley
test is commonly referred to as the "express advocacy" test, see Heather L. Sidwell, Taming
the Wild West: The FEC's Proposed Regulations to Bridle "527"Political Groups, 56 ADMIN.
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Express advocacy was defined as public communications that use
magic words such as "vote for," "elect," "support," "cast your ballot
for," "Smith for Congress," "vote against," "defeat," and "reject."5
Thus, an independent group was considered a political committee
within the scope of FECA only if the group's major purpose was to
influence elections and the group expended more than $1000 of its
resources on communications of express advocacy containing the
magic words.
The Court's decision had the effect of creating two different forms
of advocacy-express advocacy and issue advocacy. Express
advocacy constitutes political communication using the magic
words. Issue advocacy is all other political communication. Inde-
pendent groups that engage in only issue advocacy thereby do not
meet the new political committee definition and are not required to
comply with the hard money limits.5
C. The Political Party Soft Money Loophole
At first, only independent groups engaged in issue advocacy
(issue advocates) could influence elections without complying with
the hard money limits. However, political parties realized there
were ways around the law." They convinced the FEC to exempt
certain activities from the hard money limits.53 These exempted
L. REV. 939, 947 (2004), or the "magic words" test, see Holman & Claybrook, supra note 43,
at 240.
50. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52.
51. Prior to enactment of BCRA, independent groups engaged in express advocacy did
not have to comply with any of the requirements of FECA. For further discussion, see infra
Part II.
52. Richard Briffault, The Political Parties and Campaign Finance Reform, 100 COLUM.
L. REv. 620, 628-31 (2000) (discussing the history of the exemption of certain national party
activities from FECA).
53. See Briffault, supra note 7, at 150 ("The FEC held that political party committees
could pay for a significant portion of [activities benefitting federal candidates] with ... soft
money."); Briffault, supra note 52, at 629; Holman & Claybrook, supra note 43, at 239-40
(stating that "[w]ithout these words of express advocacy or something comparable, ads by
parties and groups would be viewed as educational rather than electioneering in nature");
see also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 142 & n.44 (2003) (blaming the FEC for subverting
FECA and permitting the use of more soft money than Congress had intended). For a
discussion of the FEC's role in enforcing FECA, see FED. ELECTION COMM'N, supra note 16,
at 9-11.
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party activities included "independent issue advocacy," voter
mobilization, and party infrastructure development.14 By carving
out these activities from the hard money limits, the political parties
created a soft money loophole. The political parties used this
loophole to generate large soft money contributions from individuals
seeking to curry favor with federal candidates and officeholders.
Soft money donations reached their peak in the 2000 election,
when political parties received almost $500 million.55 The vast
majority of the soft money raised was used to run television
advertisements consisting of so-called independent issue advocacy.56
To the average viewer, however, these hard-hitting independent
issue advertisements were virtually equivalent to express
advocacy.57 These advertisements effectively advocated for or
opposed an identified candidate, but did not use the magic words.58
For example, in the 1996 presidential election, the Democratic
National Committee spent millions of dollars of soft money touting
the accomplishments of the Clinton administration and criticizing
the Republican Congress without using .the magic words. 9
Political parties were not the only ones engaged in running per-
suasive issue ads known as "sham issue advocacy."6 Independent
54. Briffault, supra note 52, at 629.
55. See Public Citizen, Soft Money and Campaign Finance Reform, http://www.citizen.
org/congress/campaignissues/soft money/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2005) (reporting that the
Republican national party committees and Democratic national party committees spent
$252.8 million and $244.8 million, respectively, in soft money during the 2000 election).
56. See id. (citing Brennan Center Democracy Program, BUYING TIME 2000, available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/buyingtime2000.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2005)).
57. See Andrew Pratt, The End of Sham Issue Advocacy: The Case to Uphold
Electioneering Communications in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 87 MINN.
L. REV. 1663, 1677 (2003). For two examples of 527 advertisements from the 2004 election,
see infra text accompanying notes 131-32.
58. Brennan Center Democracy Program, supra note 56. The most common way around
the express advocacy test "[was] to include some language calling for the reader, viewer, or
listener to respond to the message by doing something other than voting." Richard Briffault,
Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1759 (1999).
This practice became known as "sham issue advocacy." Pratt, supra note 57, at 1675.
Approximately eighty percent of issue advertisements in the 1998 election called upon voters
to "call' or to 'tell' an elected official something or call the sponsoring organization." Briffault,
supra, at 1760.
59. Briffault, supra note 52, at 632.
60. See supra note 58.
318 [Vol. 47:309
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groups were also running these ads.61 Sham issue advocacy was, for
all practical purposes, the functional equivalent of express
advocacy-both sought to influence voters by urging them to take
action.62 Thus, political parties and independent groups were able
to do what FECA, as interpreted, sought to limit-they raised soft
money to fund express advocacy to influence the outcome of
elections.
D. Closing the Political Party Soft Money Loophole
This circumvention of federal campaign finance law was signifi-
cantly curtailed with the enactment of BCRA in 2002.63 BCRA
closed the political party soft money loophole and shed light on
sham issue advocacy. 4 In support of BCRA's enactment, Congress
61. See Holman & Claybrook, supra note 43, at 240 (stating that issue advocates followed
the parties' example and began their own wave of sham issue advocacy). The 2000 election
provided two excellent examples of sham issue advocacy by independent groups. One
organization, Americans for Job Security, ran an advertisement criticizing Al Gore for
proposing a gasoline tax increase by telling voters, "Don't be Gored at the gas pump." Id. at
241. Another organization, Republicans for Clean Air, ran an advertisement that criticized
Senator John McCain for favoring the use of coal-burning plants that pollute the air and
concluded with the statement: "Governor Bush, leading so each day dawns brighter."
Holman, supra note 11, at 247. The advertisement contained no magic words, enabling two
of Governor Bush's billionaire friends to use soft money to pay for the ad. See id. at 247-48.
For a description of advertising devoid of magic words by 527s in the 2004 elections, see Paul
Farhi, Two Political Ads Share More Than Fame and Controversy, WASH. POST, Sept. 7,
2004, at A2; Kurtz, supra note 5.
62. See infra note 77 and accompanying text. Their functional equivalence is highlighted
by the fact that so few candidate ads used magic words to convey a message influencing
voters to vote for the candidate. See Craig B. Holman & Luke McLoughlin, Brennan Center
for Justice, Buying Time: The Fallacies of Campaign Reform and Our Advertising Laws, Apr.
1, 2002, http://www.brennancenter.org/presscenter/oped.2002/oped 2002 0402.html.
63. See Editorial, No Winks or Nods, WASH. POST, June 14, 2004, at A16 (commenting
on BCRA's effectiveness in slowing soft money contributions from corporations to political
parties).
64. See Hearing to Examine the Scope and Operation of Organizations Registered Under
Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code Before the S. Comm. on Rules Administration,
108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Sen. Russell Feingold) [hereinafter Feingold Testimony],
available at http://www.rules.senate.gov/hearings/2004/031004_feingold.htm ("Our bill was
concerned with the raising and spending of soft money by the political parties .... "); Holman
& Claybrook, supra note 43, at 251 ("[Ihe primary objectives of BCRA [were] ... to end large
contributions ... to national parties and federal officeholders ... and ... to capture the bulk of
electioneering issue ads by parties and independent groups under federal campaign finance
law.").
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developed a record of empirical evidence demonstrating the
government's compelling interest in amending FECA.65 This record
contained evidence of corruption66 and the appearance of corruption
in the election system67 as a result of soft money loopholes6" and
sham issue advocacy.69 Finding that the government had a compel-
ling interest and the means were sufficiently narrow, the Supreme
Court upheld the major provisions of BCRA.7 °
BCRA closed the soft money loophole by limiting the use of soft
money by political parties. BCRA bans national parties from
soliciting, raising, transferring, or distributing soft money."1 Under
BCRA, state and local parties are prohibited from using soft
money to pay for federal election activities," which include public
communications that promote, support, attack, or oppose a clearly
identified federal candidate (the "PASO" standard).73
To increase awareness of sham issue advocacy, BCRA created
a new statutory test called "electioneering communication."74
65. See Whittaker, supra note 24, at 1099-100 (stating that Congress developed a
"voluminous record of evidence").
66. "[O]ver 60,000 pages of documents [were] submitted in defense of [BCRA]." Id. at
1100.
67. Id. ("This collective evidence proved Congress's belief that corruption or the
appearance of corruption existed in the political system.").
68. After Buckley, national, state, and local parties developed soft money conduits for
circumventing federal election law. Briffault, supra note 7, at 150.
69. See Pratt, supra note 57, at 1681-82 (arguing that expenditures of large amounts of
soft money on sham issue advocacy raise the appearance of corruption because organizations
making these expenditures "could benefit after that candidate comes to power").
70. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 167, 205 (2003). For a general
discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in McConnell, see Briffault, supra note 7, at 150-
61.
71. 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)(1)-(2) (2000 & Supp. II 2003).
72. Id. § 441i(b). Federal election activities are defined as:
1) voter registration activity during the 120 days before a federal election; 2)
voter identification, get-out-the-vote and generic campaign activity in
connection with elections where federal offices are at stake; 3) any "public
communication" promoting, supporting, attacking, or opposing a "clearly
identified [federal] candidate"; and 4) the services of any state-party employee
dedicating a portion of his paid time to "activities in connection with a federal
election.
Erik S. Jaffe, McConnell v. FEC: Rationing Speech to Prevent "Undue" Influence, in CATO
INSTITUTE, SUPREME COURT REVIEW, 2003-2004, at 245, 247 (Mark K. Moller ed., 2004)
(quoting 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(i)-(iv)) (alteration in original).
73. 2 U.S.C. § 431(20) (2005).
74. Id. § 434(f)(3).
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Electioneering communication is defined as: "[A]ny broadcast,
cable, or satellite communication which refers to a clearly identified
candidate for [f]ederal office," which is broadcast within sixty days
before a general election or thirty days before a primary election,
and can potentially be received by at least 50,000 persons in the
district or state the federal candidate seeks to represent. 75 Any
group that engages in electioneering communications is subject to
only disclosure requirements and source limitations. 76 This new test
was added because Congress recognized that the express advocacy
test was "functionally meaningless" and that most issue advocacy
was "functional[ly] equivalent to express advocacy.,77
As the political parties prepared for the first post-BCRA election,
they recognized that a soft money loophole remained.7" Although
BCRA closed the political party soft money loophole, the election-
eering communication definition did not curtail the ability of
independent groups to collect unlimited soft money donations.
Independent groups were still free to raise and spend soft money as
long as their activities did not constitute express advocacy. 79 A new
soft money loophole was born.
II. HISTORY OF 527 POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
A. Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code
Section 527 political organizations (527s) are named after the
section of the Internal Revenue Code under which they are
75. Id. § 434(f)(3)(A), (C).
76. Id. § 434(f)(1)-(2). For a discussion of the McConnell Court's reasoning in upholding
the electioneering communication test, see Briffault, supra note 7, at 155-59. See also infra
Part IV.A-B.
77. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 193-94, 206 (2003) (stating that
the Court found from the litigation record that the magic words requirement was
"functionally meaningless" and that most issue advocacy advertisements "are the functional
equivalent of express advocacy"). "In 2000, for example, only 2% of ads run by political
parties and other groups used Buckley's magic words." Pratt, supra note 57, at 1677 (citing
Holman & McLoughlin, supra note 62).
78. See Grimaldi & Edsall, supra note 8.
79. Independent groups could easily avoid such a limitation by not using magic words in
their political communications. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
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organized."0 Political organizations formed under § 527 are granted
tax-exempt, nonprofit status.81 To qualify for § 527 status, the
organization must be "organized for the express purpose of engag-
ing in partisan political activity."s2-If these organizations maintain
their status as independent groups, then they are free to raise and
spend unlimited soft money because they exist beyond the reach of
FECA. The only requirement placed on 527s is that- they must
disclose their contributions and expenditures to the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS), which in turn makes them available to the
public."3
The ability of 527s to influence elections differs from the ability
of other tax-exempt, nonprofit organizations formed under the
Internal Revenue Code to influence elections.8 4 The most frequently
occurring tax-exempt organization is a 501(c)(3) organization, which
is also named after an Internal Revenue Code section."8 The
501(c)(3) organizations are permitted to lobby elected officials to a
limited extent, but are disallowed from expressly engaging in
partisan or electioneering activities.8 6 Another form of tax-exempt
80. See I.R.C. § 527 (2000).
81. I.R.C. § 527(a), (e)(1) (2000) (The term 'political organization' means a party,
committee, association, fund, or other organization (whether or not incorporated) organized
and operated primarily for the purpose of directly or indirectly accepting contributions or
making expenditures, or both, for an exempt function."). An exempt function is defined as
"the function of influencing or attempting to influence the selection, nomination, election, or
appointment of any individual to any Federal, State, or local public office." I.R.C. § 527(e)(2).
527s are exempt from federal income and gift tax, but must pay a tax on investment income.
Elizabeth Kingsley & John Pomeranz, A Crash at the Crossroads: Tax and Campaign
Finance Laws Collide in Regulation of Political Activities of Tax-Exempt Organizations, 31
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 55, 61 (2004).
82. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 174 n.67. See also id. at 177 (stating that 527 organizations
"by definition engage in partisan political activity").
83. Kingsley & Pomeranz, supra note 81, at 61-62. In 2000, campaign finance reform
advocates amended § 527 to require disclosure of donations of more than $200 and disclosure
of expenditures of more than $500. Donald B. Tobin, Anonymous Speech and Section 527 of
the Internal Revenue Code, 37 GA. L. REV. 611, 625 (2003). This legislation was enacted in
response to the television advertisements run by Republicans for a Clean Air, a § 527
organization, against Senator John McCain in the 2000 Republican presidential primary. See
discussion supra note 60. Campaign finance reformers were upset that a § 527 organization
funded by two Texas billionaires could influence the outcome of the primary election without
complying with FECA. See Holman, supra note 11, at 247-48; Tobin, supra, at 625.
84. Kingsley & Pomeranz, supra note 81, at 60-61.
85. Id. at 60.
86. See id. For the definition of federal election activities, see supra note 72.
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organization is a 501(c)(4) organization, which is also named after
a section of the Internal Revenue Code.17 Section 501(c)(4) organiza-
tions are generally considered social welfare organizations and are
permitted to pursue political and other activities.8 The expenses for
political activities, however, cannot be one-half or more of the
organization's total budget. 9 Both 501(c)(3) and 501(c) (4) organiza-
tions maintain their tax-exempt status only if they limit their
efforts to influence elections.9"
Congress did not originally intend for 527 organizations to
influence elections without limitation.9 1 Congress enacted § 527 in
response to IRS uncertainty about how to treat political organiza-
tions for income tax purposes.92 Congress resolved this uncertainty
by deciding to treat all political organizations in the same manner
as it treats 501(c) organizations-they would be exempt from
income taxation.93 Congress granted this exemption on the belief
that political organizations "properly regulated" by FECA positively
contribute to democratic societies.94 This belief is evidenced by the
nearly identical language Congress used to describe organizations
allowed to organize under § 527-having the primary purpose of
influencing elections-and the language used in FECA's political
committee definition-having the major purpose of influencing
elections.95 At the time of § 527's enactment, such political organiza-
tions were within the scope of FECA's regulations. Thus, Congress
87. Kingsley & Pomeranz, supra note 81, at 60-61.
88. Id.
89. Thomas B. Edsall & James V. Grimaldi, New Routes for Money to Sway Voters: 501c
Groups Escape Disclosure Rules, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2004, at Al.
90. Other tax-exempt organizations include 501(c)(5) and 501(c)(6) organizations, which
are limited in their political activities, similar to 501(c)(4) organizations. Kingsley &
Pomeranz, supra note 81, at 61.
91. Francis R. Hill, Probing the Limits of Section 527 to Design a New Campaign Vehicle,
86 TAX NOTES 387, 390 (2000); Holman, supra note 11, at 266; Tobin, supra note 83, at 622-
25.
92. Tobin, supra note 83, at 621-22. The IRS's uncertainty arose from its inability to
characterize political organizations as 501(c)s, and thus tax-exempt, or as for-profit entities,
and thus subject to income tax. See id. at 627-28.
93. Holman, supra note 11, at 266; Tobin, supra note 83, at 621-24 (discussing the
motivation for congressional action in adding § 527).
94. Tobin, supra note 83, at 624.
95. See Sidwell, supra note 49, at 941 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 527(1) (2002); 2 U.S.C. §§ 433-
434 (2000)).
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granted the tax exemption with the intention that FECA would
limit the ability of 527s to influence elections.
Congress's intention was undermined when the Supreme Court
concluded in Buckley that FECA's political committee definition
was unconstitutional.96 As discussed above, the Court interpreted
the language of FECA's political committee definition to apply only
to organizations with the major purpose of influencing elections
through expenditures that expressly advocate the election or defeat
of a federal candidate.97 Thus, after Buckley, only 527s engaged in
express advocacy-communications that used the magic words-
would be governed by FECA.
The IRS further undermined Congress's original intent when it
chose not to use Buckley's express advocacy test to determine
whether an organization qualified for tax exemption under § 527.98
Such a test would have limited § 527 eligibility to only those
organizations that engaged in express advocacy and thus, would
have been governed by FECA. Instead, the IRS adopted a broader
test for determining § 527 eligibility.99 The broader test grants § 527
eligibility to any organization that cannot qualify for § 501 (c) status
because they seek to influence an election beyond the permitted
level.100 Any group formed for the express purpose of engaging in
partisan political activity could now organize under § 527 and avoid
complying with FECA's requirements.10'
As a result, organizations which admittedly sought to influence
elections could escape FECA by carefully wording their political
communications. These carefully worded sham issue ads leave no
doubt as to the influence they seek to exert on the election
96. See Tobin, supra note 83, at 624; supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
97. See Tobin, supra note 83, at 624; supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
98. Tobin, supra note 83, at 629.
99. Id. The IRS's adoption of the broader test resulted from political operatives
recognizing the tax advantages of§ 527. These political operatives argued persuasively to the
IRS that their activities were political and partisan in nature, qualifying them for § 527 tax
protection. At the same time, these organizations persuasively argued to the FEC that these
same activities were nonpartisan issue advocacy, and thus did not fall within the definition
of political committee. 527 Hearing, supra note 22 (statement of Sen. Feingold); see also 527
Hearing, supra note 22 (statement of Professor Frances R. Hill, Univ. of Miami Sch. of Law).
100. Tobin, supra note 83, at 629.
101. For examples from the 2004 election, see infra note 131-32 and accompanying text.
324 [Vol. 47:309
THE 527 SOFT MONEY LOOPHOLE
system. 112 Section 527 enables soft money donors to influence the
outcome of an election while avoiding hard money limits.103
B. The 527 Soft Money Loophole
Initially, Congress did not reassert its original intent due to First
Amendment concerns. Section 527 was mainly used by independent
organizations engaged in issue advocacy. 104 Section 527 enabled
these organizations to raise soft money to fund political communica-
tions that focused on issue discussion.10 5 For example, a 527
organization could have spent soft money to rate the qualifications
of all candidates for Congress on nonpartisan criteria and "publish]
the results prior to an election."'0 6 Another organization could have
spent soft money to publish a voter guide for its members and
others concerned with a public policy issue.10 7 Engaging in these
types of activities meant that 527s operated mainly on the sidelines
of our election system.
0 8
During this time, the Supreme Court weighed in again. In
Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life
(MCFL),1 °9 the Court indicated in dicta that subjecting an independ-
ent political group not engaged in express advocacy to contributions
limits similar to those designed for political committees likely
102. See supra note 60; infra note 170.
103. For example, George Soros gave more than $23 million to various 527s for the specific
purpose of defeating President George Bush; Bob Perry gave more than $8 million to various
527s for the specific purpose of defeating John Kerry. Center for Responsive Politics,
Individuals, supra note 9. Wealthy donors from Texas earned the state the nickname "ATM
state" as a result of the $36 million contributed to 527s. John Frank, City, State Give Big to
Maverick 527 Groups: Houston Leans Left in Its Support of Independent, Partisan Advocates,
Hous. CHRON., Oct. 10, 2004, at 1.
104. See generally Kingsley & Pomeranz, supra note 81, at 114 (stating that "[m]any
organizations that qualify for tax exemption under I.R.C. § 527 are not primarily engaged
in influencing federal elections').
105. Such communications were a part of the vital discussion and debate the Supreme
Court sought to protect from FECA. See supra text accompanying notes 45-47.
106. See Kingsley & Pomeranz, supra note 81, at 116.
107. See id. at 117.
108. See generally Nelson, supra note 2 (reporting that 527s were minor players prior to
2004). Previously, political parties dominated the election system through soft money
contributions. See supra Part I.C.
109. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
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infringed on First Amendment rights."' The Court noted that this
would hold true only if the independent political group's expendi-
tures did not become so significant as to indicate the group's major
purpose was to influence elections."' If the group's expenditures
reached such a level, however, it could be appropriate to classify the
group as a political committee." 2
After MCFL, § 527 was used increasingly by individuals or
groups wanting anonymity while seeking to influence elections."
3
Political organizers recognized that § 527 enabled them to use soft
money to fund sham issue advocacy to influence the outcome of
elections." 4 The proliferation of this use of 527 organizations in the
2000 election prompted efforts to institute reform." 5 After the
airing of the Republicans for Clean Air ad during the 2000 prima-
ries, Congress passed legislation amending § 527 to require
disclosure of contributions and expenditures. ' 6 This legislation
ensured that wealthy, self-interested individuals could not hide
behind an anonymous entity, but it did not extend the hard money
limits to 527s.
In 2004, 527s emerged as a dominating and defining influential
force in the American election system."'7 As political parties readied
for the first post-BCRA elections, political operatives launched "a
secret effort to continue the flow of soft money" into the election
system."' These operatives devised a plan to use § 527 political
organizations to do what BCRA barred the political parties from
110. Id. at 254-55. Only if an independent political group engaged in express advocacy
would it be classified as a political committee and subject to FECA's contribution limits. See
id. at 262.
111. Id. at 262.
112. Id.
113. See Tobin, supra note 83, at 613-14 (stating that 527 organizations were often used
to influence elections without revealing the identity of the contributors). Tobin cites, as an
example, the Republicans for Clean Air ad discussed in note 60. See id. at 614-15. After some
pressure, the sponsors revealed their identities: Republicans for Clean Air consisted of two
members, both Texas billionaires and major contributors to the Bush campaign. Id.
114. See Pratt, supra note 57, at 1676-77 (stating that sham issue advocacy has become
prevalent in current campaigns).
115. See Sidwell, supra note 49, at 942.
116. Id. For a discussion of the disclosure requirements, see supra note 83 and
accompanying text.
117. See supra note 2.
118. Grimaldi & Edsall, supra note 8.
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doing: "[R]aise and spend unlimited contributions of 'soft money'...
to influence federal elections."" 9 The 527s were set up to collect soft
money to finance the same voter-influencing activities that political
parties previously conducted using soft money contributions.
120
C. FEC Declines to Close the 527 Soft Money Loophole
Outraged by these efforts to circumvent and violate the spirit of
the campaign finance laws, campaign finance reformers called upon
the FEC to plug the 527 soft money loophole. 12' Responding to
pressure to close the loophole,'22 the FEC made two attempts to
adopt campaign finance regulations which would have barred 527s
from raising and spending soft money to influence federal cam-
paigns. 12 Reformers argued that the FEC had the power to close
the loophole under current law and that congressional action was
not necessary. 24 Opponents argued that only Congress could close
119. Edsall & Grimaldi, supra note 89. These voter-influencing activities are referred to
as "electioneering activities." See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
120. Balz & Edsall, supra note 10.
121. See Kingsley & Pomeranz, supra note 81, at 109-12 (stating that effective advocacy
from campaign finance reformers and others resulted in an FEC attempt to eliminate the 527
soft money loophole).
122. See Sidwell, supra note 49, at 944-45 (describing the reactions of Senators John
McCain and Russell Feingold, the Republican Party, and campaign watchdog groups to the
reemergence of unregulated soft money contributions through 527s); Thomas B. Edsall,
Chairman Backs Organizations' Use of "Soft Money" McCain-Feingold Campaign Finance
Law Doesn't Apply to Political Interest Groups, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2004, at A4 (reporting
that "[tihe Republican National Committee, which would not take such action without the
blessings of the Bush White House, has called on the FEC to rein in" 527s); Thomas B.
Edsall, Proposed Rules for "527" Groups Lead to Some Unusual Alliances, WASH. POST, Apr.
14,2004, at A23 [hereinafter Edsall, Unusual Alliances] (reporting that the chief Senate and
House sponsors of BCRA warned the FEC that "[t]o do nothing would be to bless a loophole
that will have grave consequences for the efficacy of [campaign finance law] and again leave
the public with the impression that the election laws can be treated with disdain without any
consequence.").
123. See Federal Election Commission Open Meeting Thursday, May 13, 2004 Agenda,
http://www.fec.gov/agenda/2004/agenda20040513.html; Federal Election Commission Open
Meeting Thursday, Aug. 19,2004 Agenda, http://www.fec.gov/agenda/2004/agenda20040819.
html. For a review of the FEC's efforts and the argument presented before the FEC, see
Sidwell, supra note 49, at 940-41.
124. See Feingold Testimony, supra note 64 (criticizing the FEC's decision to allow 527
political committees not engaged in express advocacy to "operate under the radar screen ...
contrary to the Supreme Court's guidance in the Buckley decision where the express
advocacy test was created to limit the applicability of the election laws to groups that were
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the loophole, that the proposals under consideration were unconsti-
tutional infringements on the First Amendment rights of issue
advocates, and that the proposals were politically motivated.'25
After considering the issue, the FEC decided not to adopt the
regulations necessary to close the loophole. 126 Dismayed by the
FEC's decision, campaign reform advocates introduced legislation
in an attempt to close the loophole.127 The reformers acknowledged,
however, that the proposed legislation could not have been passed
before the November 2004 elections.
1 28
As a result, the 527 soft money loophole was exploited in the 2004
election year. Political operatives formed new 527s with the
announced purpose of raising soft money and express purpose of
advocating the election or defeat of the candidates.129 Their efforts
not in the business of influencing elections"); Senator John McCain, Plugging the Loophole:
If the FEC Were Doing Its Job, 527s Would Face the Same Rules as Everybody
Else-Beginning With Limited Donations, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 20,2004, at 24 (stating the view
that 527s that seek to influence federal elections must comply with campaign finance laws
and that an indifferent FEC is to blame for allowing 527s to break the law).
125. See Sidwell, supra note 49, at 950-54 (summarizing public reaction to the proposals
to close the 527 soft money loophole); see also Edsall, Unusual Alliances, supra note 122
("Democratic and Republican leaders believe that the outcome of the FEC deliberations could
dramatically affect the race between President Bush and Sen. John F. Kerry, the
presumptive Democratic nominee.").
126. Minutes of an Open Meeting of the Federal Election Commission (May 13, 2004),
http://www.fec.gov/agenda/2004/approveO4-51.pdf (rejecting the motion to approve Agenda
Document No. 04-44); Minutes of an Open Meeting of the Federal Election Commission (Aug.
19,2004), http://www.fec.gov/agenda/2004/approveO4-77.pdf (rejecting the motion to approve
Agenda Document No. 04-75-A). These agenda documents contained proposed regulations
similar to the 527 legislation discussed in this Note. See also Thomas B. Edsall, FEC Votes
to Curb Nonparty Donations: Stricter Rules Will Go Into Effect in January, WASH. POST, Aug.
20, 2004, at A6 (reporting that the FEC, in its August 2004 meeting, passed regulations
effective January 2005 to narrow the 527 soft money loophole but not close it); Thomas B.
Edsall, In Boost for Democrats, FEC Rejects Proposed Limits on Small Donors, WASH. POST,
May 14, 2004, at A9 [hereinafter Edsall, Boost] (reporting that the FEC rejected proposed
rules for regulating 527s at its May 2004 meeting).
127. See 527 Reform Act of 2004, S. 2828, 108th Cong. §§ 2-3 (2004); 527 Reform Act of
2004, H.R. 5127, 108th Cong. §§ 2-3 (2004); Dewar, supra note 20.
128. Dewar, supra note 20. As predicted, the legislation did not pass prior to the November
2004 elections. S. 2828; H.R. 5127. As a result, the reformers initiated a new effort to pass
legislation closing the loophole in the next congressional session. See supra note 22 and
accompanying text.
129. See E.J. Dionne, Jr., Editorial, Playing with Fire on 'Soft Money,'WASH. POST, Mar.
16, 2004, at A21 (commenting on Harold Ickes' travels across the country to raise soft money
for his 527 to run ads directed against George Bush; Ickes was a top lieutenant to Bill
Clinton); Thomas B. Edsall, GOP Creating Own '527' Groups: Unregulated Funds Can Be
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included base-mobilizing voter registration, get-out-the-vote efforts,
and sham issue advocacy aimed at promoting a favored candidate
or attacking a disfavored candidate. 3 ° For example, one 527
advertisement criticized President Bush for making a joke about
the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq when
military members died doing just that.'31 Another 527 advertise-
ment criticized Senator John Kerry for "supposed flip-flopping by
showing a groom dumping his bride to passionately embrace her
best friend.''1 32 The end result was a federal election "defined, and
dominated, by three numbers: 527.'' 3
III. LEGISLATION'S BASIC FRAMEWORK AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONCERNS
The 2004 election experience shows that new legislation is
needed to bring 527s within the letter and spirit of federal cam-
paign finance law. Campaign finance reformers have proposed
legislation that creates a new definition specifically for 527s for the
term "political committee."1 4 Generally, this legislation defines a
Raised, WASH. POST, May 25, 2004, at A15 [hereinafter Edsall, GOP] (reporting that
Republican operatives launched an effort to raise soft money through a 527 with close ties
to the Bush administration to purchase television ads praising administration policies).
130. See Balz & Edsall, supra note 10, at Al ('The Democratic groups have created five
organizations to oversee facets of the campaign: paid advertising; voter identification and
turnout; communications, polling research and rapid response; fundraising; and the
coordination of the operations of more than two dozen liberal organizations."); Edsall, GOP,
supra note 129; Thomas B. Edsall, Pro-GOP Groups Outpaced in Funds: Pro-Democratic
'527s' Far Ahead, WASH. POST, July 16, 2004, at A9 (reporting that 527s were virtual
"shadow" parties performing basic party functions such as get-out-the-vote drives and
running anti-Bush ads).
131. See Kurtz, supra note 5.
132. See id.
133. Hosenball, Isikoff & Bailey, supra note 2, at 23.
134. See S. 271, 109th Cong. (2005) (using the PASO standard to examine expenditures
to determine which 527s must comply with the hard money limits); H.R. 513, 109th Cong.
(2005) (same). See also S. 2828, 108th Cong. (2004) (same); H.R. 5127, 108th Cong. (2004)
(same); Political Committee Status, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,736, 11,757 (proposed Alternative 2-A
for 11 C.F.R. § 100.5(a)(2)(iv)) [hereinafter Alternative 2-A] (using the PASO standard to
examine expenditures in order to determine which 527s must comply with the hard money
limits as an alternative proposal to the FEC's initial proposed rules for regulating 527s).
After the FEC published its initial Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Political Committee
Status, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,736 (proposed Mar. 11, 2004) (seeking public comment on proposed
revisions to FECA's political committee definition), alternative methods of bringing 527s
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political committee as an organization formed under § 527 of the
Internal Revenue Code that promotes, attacks, supports, or opposes
a federal candidate.'35 Exempted from the proposed legislation's
reach are 527s organized for the following purposes: influencing
elections of nonfederal candidates, influencing nonfederal elections,
influencing elections without federal candidates on the ballot,
influencing state ballot initiatives or referenda, and influencing the
selection of individuals to nonelected offices or leadership positions
within political parties.'36 The proposed legislation would therefore
amend FECA to create a second definition for the term political
committee, 137 but it still would not capture all activities by 527s.
The legislation captures only those activities by 527s that do not
meet the carveouts and only those activities by 527s that promote,
attack, support, or oppose a federal candidate. 138 Only 527s meeting
the new definition for the term political committee would fall within
the federal hard money limits. Exempted 527s and 527s that did
not engage in electioneering activities that promote, attack,
support, or oppose a federal candidate, on the other hand, would not
be subject to the hard money limits. For example, 527s could still
within federal campaign finance law were suggested. See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Comments
to FEC: April 5, 2004, 31 N. KY. L. REv. 361, 362 (2004) (proposing that the FEC reject a
major purpose test based solely on § 527 and adopt a broader major purpose test that asks
whether one-half of an organization's expenditures are used for federal electioneering
activities). One method in particular received the support of the FEC's Office of General
Counsel and would require "an organization to have 'as its major purpose the nomination or
election of one or more candidates for federal office."' Draft Final Rules for Political
Committee Status (Agenda Document No. 04-75 for FEC Open Meeting Agenda for Aug. 19,
2004), http://www. fec.gov/agenda/mtgdoc04-75.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2005) (basing the
major purpose definition on one-half expenditures for federal electioneering activities). The
General Counsel's proposal continued to use the PASO standard to define the expenditure
prong of the political committee definition. Id. For a detailed discussion of the one-half
expenditure test, see Edward B. Foley, The "Major Purpose" Test: Distinguishing Between
Election-Focused and Issue-Focused Groups, 31 N. KY. L. REV. 341, 351-59 (2004).
135. Alternative 2-A, supra note 134; see also S. 271 (using similar exceptions); H.R. 513
(using similar exceptions); S. 2828 (using similar exceptions); H.R. 5127 (using similar
exceptions).
136. Alternative 2-A, supra note 134; see also S. 2828 (providing similar carveouts to
protect against overbreadth concerns); H.R. 5127 (providing the same carveouts as S. 2828).
137. FECA's original political committee definition, as interpreted by the Supreme Court,
would remain in effect. See supra note 136. For a discussion of the original definition
interpreted by the Supreme Court, see supra Part I.B.
138. The carveouts are the exceptions discussed supra notes 134-36 and accompanying
text.
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raise soft money to fund the following activities: publishing voter
guides that contain voting records on a particular ideological issue
but "containf no express statements in support of or in opposition
to any candidate"; activities devoted to "improving the quality of
elected officials [by] rating the qualifications of all candidates for
Congress" on nonpartisan factors; publication of a candidate list
whose members pledged to act in accordance with campaign ethics;
and activities to promote state ballot initiatives.139 The 527s, and all
other forms of independent groups, would remain free to raise soft
money so long as their activities did not bring them within the
scope of either definition of "political committee."'4 °
The basic framework of the proposed legislation has been
denounced as unconstitutional. Opponents argue that the legisla-
tion is unconstitutionally vague and overly broad, and, as a result,
would subject activities protected by freedom of speech to govern-
mental regulation.14 1 The threat that the basic framework would
fail under judicial review was enough to block the proactive efforts
of campaign reformers to close the flow of soft money in the 2004
presidential election. 142 Although these concerns are valid, this Note
argues that the proposed 527 legislation is constitutional. The
139. Kingsley & Pomeranz, supra note 81, 115-18. These examples are derived from the
article written by Elizabeth Kingsley and John Pomeranz, and based on testimony Pomeranz
"prepare[d] for the [FEC] in response to the Commission's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
on Political Committee Status." Id. at 55 n.* & 115-18.
140. Independent groups would still be subject to any limitations that the tax code may
impress upon their entity status. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text. These
independent groups may also be subject to other aspects of federal election law, such as the
electioneering communication provision discussed supra notes 74-76.
141. See Kingsley & Pomeranz, supra note 81, at 113-18 (discussing how the use of§ 527
to define major purpose will result in excessive regulation and fail constitutional
requirements that federal election law not be vague and overly broad); see also Sidwell, supra
note 49, at 952-53 (summarizing the vagueness and overbreadth concerns raised in
comments to the FEC's proposed regulations). Kingsley and Pomeranz argue that the
legislation based on § 527 is vague, overly broad, and unconstitutional. See Kingsley &
Pomeranz, supra note 81, at 113-18. Their argument is based on the assumption that this
legislation would capture all 527 activities. At least with regard to the proposed legislation
discussed in this Note, however, that is not the case. The activities cited by Kingsley and
Pomeranz would not be captured by the proposed legislation because 527s engaged in those
activities would not be promoting, supporting, attacking, or opposing a clearly identified
federal candidate, or otherwise engaging in exempted activities.
142. See Sidwell, supra note 49, at 953-54 (suggesting that concerns about how to properly
define political committee may have resulted in the FEC taking a precautionary approach).
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legislation is sufficiently narrow to achieve the compelling interest
of preventing the corrupting influence of soft money funneled
through 527 political organizations. Strict scrutiny concerns,
therefore, should not be a barrier to efforts to close the 527 soft
money loophole.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE BASIC FRAMEWORK
A. Standard of Review
Since Buckley, the Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny
judicial review to election laws encroaching on free speech.143 Strict
scrutiny is used to protect the important role of free speech in our
election system.' The degree to which the Supreme Court applies
strict scrutiny, however, has declined since Buckley.'45 The Court's
use of strict scrutiny review in McConnell illustrates the effect of
this decline.
In McConnell, the Court set out different degrees of strict
scrutiny based on the type of federal electioneering activity the
election law sought to capture. Contribution limits to a political
campaign committee were reviewed with "closely drawn" strict
scrutiny'46 because
143. See James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, The First Amendment Is Still Not a
Loophole: Examining McConnell's Exception to Buckley's General Rule Protecting Issue
Advocacy, 31 N. KY. L. REV. 289, 300-01 (2004); Kingsley & Pomeranz, supra note 81, at 103.
144. Kingsley & Pomeranz, supra note 81, at 103-04; see supra notes 40-42 and
accompanying text.
145. Telephone Interview with Michael E. Toner, Commissioner, Federal Election
Commission (Nov. 19, 2004). In Nixon v. Shrink, 528 U.S. 377 (2000), the Court deferred to
the Missouri legislature's determination that a $275 contribution limit was necessary to
prevent corruption in some circumstances. Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Stevens all
recognized that "post-Buckley experiences with campaign finance have demonstrated that
... a flexible approach to the constitutional review of campaign finance rules [is needed]."
Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 108 (2d Cir. 2004). The Second Circuit recently applied a
weak form of strict scrutiny to uphold expenditure limits within Buckley's framework, even
though Buckley itself invalidated expenditure limits because the limits were not justified by
the government's compelling interest in preventing corruption. See Landell, 382 F.3d at 110-
14 (explaining why the court would grant deference to the legislature's findings).
146. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 136 (2003) (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted); Joshua Downie, McConnell v. FEC: Supporting Congress and
Congress's Attempt at Campaign Finance Reform, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 927, 931 (2004). "Closely
drawn" strict scrutiny is basically mid-tier review. Telephone Interview with Michael E.
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individuals do not have a First Amendment right to give
unlimited sums to political parties to spend on activities
designed to secure an electoral result. They lack this right, even
though they do have a First Amendment right, acting by
themselves, to spend as much of their own money as they wish
on the same activities. 147
If, however, the election law borders on issue advocacy, the degree
of scrutiny applied is greater than "closely drawn" strict scrutiny.14
8
As the Court stated in McConnell, this greater degree of strict
scrutiny requires that the federal electioneering activity subjected
to an election law be the functional equivalent of express
advocacy. 
149
Toner, supra note 145. Closely drawn scrutiny was used by the Court to uphold the soft
money restrictions BCRA placed on the national, state, and local parties. Downie, supra, at
931. The Court applied the lower degree of scrutiny because it found that restrictions on soft
money contributions were not expenditure limitations that required a higher degree of
scrutiny. Id.
147. Foley, supra note 134, at 343.
The reason for this distinction is twofold: first, according to longstanding
Supreme Court doctrine, their interest in giving money to a political party has
less strength under the First Amendment than their interest in spending their
own money for their own political activities; and, second, the risk that winning
candidates will become improperly beholden to the financial largess of
individuals is less when individuals spend their money acting on their own than
when individuals give] the money to a political party (this second point being
true in part because individuals are less likely to be motivated by an improper
desire to produce an indebted candidate when they pay for their own electoral
activities undertaken on their own initiative than when they simply write
checks to a political party).
Id. at 343-44.
148. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 143, at 301 (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206)
("McConnell requires that statutes bordering on issue advocacy must be analyzed under the
Buckley [and] McConnell line of precedents so as to employ the express advocacy test or its
functional equivalent.").
149. Id. Recall that the Supreme Court in Buckley created the express advocacy test to
address concerns that FECA was overly broad. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
In McConnell, the Court held that Buckley's express advocacy line was merely one possible
solution to constitutional problems in the language of FECA, "and that other definitions of
speech to be regulated could satisfy the First Amendment." Jaffe, supra note 72, at 259
(citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 190-92). The McConnell majority then went on to consider
whether electioneering communication was a definition of regulated speech that could satisfy
the First Amendment. The majority found that express advocacy had become "functionally
meaningless." McConnell, 540 U.S. at 192-94. The majority then asked whether
electioneering communication was the functional equivalent of express advocacy. The
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The new 527 legislation is intended as a contribution limit to
close the soft money loophole. 150 Attempts to capture 527s within
campaign finance laws, however, will also border on issue advocacy.
If the legislation survives the functional equivalent strict scrutiny
review applied to election laws that border on issue advocacy, then
it will survive closely drawn scrutiny, a lesser standard.
To survive functional equivalent strict scrutiny review, the basic
framework of the proposed 527 legislation must survive a two-part
test similar to true strict scrutiny review. 15' First, the government
must have a compelling interest in restricting election-related
activity.152 Second, the government's means of achieving these
interests must be sufficiently tailored to meet the interests. 153 This
Note will show that the basic framework of the proposed 527
legislation survives both tests, and is therefore constitutional.
B. Compelling Government Interests
The Supreme Court has found two compelling government
interests for restricting certain federal electioneering activities:
corruption and circumvention. The corruption interest is broadly
defined as the prevention of corruption and the appearance of
corruption. 154 The circumvention interest is defined as preventing
circumvention of federal election law.'5 Both of these compelling
majority found the two were functionally equivalent and thus held that the new statutory
definition of regulated speech was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. McConnell, 540
U.S. at 194; Jaffe, supra note 72, at 259.
150. Although the proposed legislation is intended to be a soft money restriction, there is
no guarantee that a court would view it that way because it also encroaches on groups
interested in issue advocacy. For this reason, this Note uses the higher degree of strict
scrutiny to determine constitutionality.
151. Bopp & Coleson, supra note 143, at 300-01. "McConnell requires generally that laws
restricting free ... speech that border on issue advocacy ... must be narrowly tailored to a
compelling state interest. Within strict scrutiny[,] ... McConnell requires that statutes
bordering on issue advocacy must be analyzed ... so as to employ the express advocacy test
or its functional equivalent." Id. (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 205-06).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See Briffault, supra note 7, at 162-67; Whittaker, supra note 24, at 1075-83. The
McConnell decision reaffirmed that preventing corruption as a compelling government
interest. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 135-37.
155. Briffault, supra note 7, at 149. Circumvention was a new compelling government
interest recognized in McConnell. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 185.
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government interests are sufficient to overcome concerns that an
election law encroaches on First Amendment rights.'56
1. Preventing Corruption and the Appearance of Corruption
In Buckley, the Court defined corruption as a quid pro quo.'57 The
Court found that "[t]o the extent that large contributions are given
to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office
holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is
undermined."'58 In McConnell, the Court reaffirmed the govern-
ment's interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of
corruption by limiting "immense aggregations of wealth that are
accumulated with the help of the corporate form." '159
In McConnell, the Court expanded the definition of corruption by
recognizing two new forms of corruption. First, the definition of
corruption was expanded to include special access. 6 ' The peddling
of special access to federal officeholders in exchange for soft money
donations to political parties was well documented in the legislative
record.' 6 ' Special access was distinguished from the access given
based on "friendship, family ties, ideological affinity, or prior
support."'62 The Court found that "special access procured by money
... is uniquely corrupt"'63 and held that "Congress could take steps
156. See Whittaker, supra note 24, at 1075 (stating that McConneU reaffirmed Buckley's
holding that actual corruption or the appearance of corruption was sufficient to overcome
First Amendment scrutiny).
157. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27.
158. Id. The Court did not define quid pro quo. The Court indicated only that the term was
more inclusive than outright bribery. Briffault, supra note 7, at 162. In the thirty years since
Buckley, the Court has been "maddeningly imprecise" in its definition of corruption. Id. Quid
pro quo has been described as "dollars for political favors," Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985), and as the compliance of
politicians with the "wishes of large contributors," Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't Political
Action Comm., 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000). For a detailed discussion of the Court's attempts to
define corruption, see Whittaker, supra note 24, at 1075-84.
159. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 205.
160. Id. at 149-51; Briffault, supra note 7, at 162-63. Special access was viewed by the
court as preferential treatment by federal officeholders given to soft money contributors. Id.
Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion argued that special access only shows favoritism or
influence but not corrupt favoritism or influence. Id. at 163 (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at
295-96).
161. Briffault, supra note 7, at 163 n.111 (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 149-51).
162. Id. at 164.
163. Id. (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 186).
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to eliminate a campaign finance device that created special
incentives to officeholders to give special access to donors.' ' 4 This
campaign finance device was soft money.
Second, the definition was expanded to recognize the "'special
relationship and unity of interest"' that exists between federal
officeholders and political parties.'65 The Court noted the many
ways in which candidates do, in fact, benefit from soft money-
funded activities. Moreover, the Court found that "the danger of
corrupt exchanges through the parties was reflected and reinforced
by campaign finance practices."'6 These practices included:
[Tihe candidates' awareness of the identities of soft money
donors and of the use of the soft funds and of the candidates'
consequent gratitude for the soft money donations; the role of
federal candidates and officeholders in running party campaign
committees and soliciting soft funds; and the parties' use of
access to federal officeholders as an incentive to and a reward
for soft money donations .... 167
This special relationship and unity of interest present the "possibil-
ity that donations to party committees raise the same corruption
dangers as donations to the candidates.' 68
The 527s present Congress with the same corruption concerns
that justified election law limiting donations to candidates and
political parties. Operated as virtual political parties, 69 527s that
are engaged in activities that promote, attack, support, or oppose
164. Id. at 163. Briffault discusses the benefit of shifting the focus of corruption from
undue influence to access. The shift allows for a more measurable analysis. Id. at 163-64.
165. Id. at 165 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 145). Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion
argued against this broad definition of corruption on the basis that contributions are only
corrupt when there is "a direct connection between the donor and the candidate.
Contributions to the parties not earmarked for specific candidates and not involving
solicitation by candidates or officeholders could not be corrupt because they do not involve
a relationship between a donor and a candidate or officeholder." Id. at 165 (citing McConnell,
540 U.S. at 295-96 (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part)).
166. Id. at 165.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 119-20. Based on their activities and organizers,
527s have been described as shadow political parties. See Holman & Claybrook, supra note
43, at 251 (describing 527s as emerging shadow political parties created by political party
operatives for the purpose of raising soft money to fund a second campaign).
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a clearly identified federal candidate have a special relationship
and unity of interest with the federal candidates they support, as
seen in the 2004 election. These 527s announced their intent to
secure the election or defeat of their favored federal candidate.17 °
They then proceeded to engage in federal electioneering activities
aimed at achieving this goal. These 527s were so effective that even
if a voter could distinguish a 527 advertisement from a candidate's
advertisement, the voter probably thought the 527 colluded with
the candidate.'71 Furthermore, these 527s were run by political
party operatives or former-sometimes even current-members of
federal campaign staffs.172
It is probable that soft money donations to 527s will raise the
same corruption dangers as soft money donations to federal
candidates and political parties if the 527s operate analogously to
political parties. Federal candidates know the identities of the soft
money contributors. The soft money contributions are either
announced by the contributor, 73 reported by the press, 7 4 tracked by
campaign finance reform proponents,'75 or listed in disclosure
170. See Balz & Edsall, supra note 10 (reporting the reasons why Democrats formed a
parallel campaign using § 527); see also Paul Farhi, Veterans Group Criticizes Kerry's War
Record, WASH. POST, May 5, 2004, at A6 (reporting on Democrats' allegations that the
formation of Swift Boat Veterans for Truth was to attack John Kerry's military record).
171. See Kurtz, supra note 5 ("A lot of people don't pay attention to the disclosure at the
end about who authorized it,' said William Benoit, a University of Missouri communications
professor. 'Even if they do notice it's not a candidate ad, a lot of people probably think they're
colluding with the candidates."'); Carol D. Leonnig, Bush Sues to Stop '527' Groups Backing
Kerry, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2004, at A6 (reporting that one of the claims in President Bush's
suit was that the Kerry campaign and Democratic-leaning 527 organizations were
coordinating their efforts). For examples, see references to the ads described supra in text
accompanying notes 132-33.
172. Board members, consultants, lawyers, and staff members of 527 organizations are,
in fact, often active party partisans. See, e.g., Dan Balz & Thomas B. Edsall, Lawyer Quits
Bush-Cheney Organization: Campaigns Spar Over Ties to Outside Funding Groups, WASH.
POST, Aug. 26, 2004, at Al (reporting on the connections between the Bush and Kerry
campaigns and 527s); Hosenball, Isikoff & Bailey, supra note 2, at 26 (providing a "flow
chart," entitled "A Small, Partisan Universe," detailing the interconnectedness of the staffs
of pro-Democrat and pro-Republican 527s and their respective national party apparatuses).
173. See Grimaldi & Edsall, supra note 8 (discussing a recent interview with billionaire
George Soros regarding his continued donations to political groups).
174. See id. (reporting on the largest soft money contributors to 527s during the 2004
election).
175. Center for Responsive Politics, Contributors, supra note 9; Center for Responsive
Politics, Individuals, supra note 9; The Center for Public Integrity, Major Individual Donors
to 527 Committees, http://www.publicintegrity.org/527/search.aspx?act=con&sec=indiv&
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reports submitted to the IRS. 176 In fact, during the 2004 election,
federal campaigns called upon 527s to raise and spend soft money
for their benefit.
177
Recognizing the benefit 527s provided during the 2004 campaign,
large soft money contributors may be promised or even given
special access to the federal candidates, a promise one 527 organiza-
tion touted in its soft money fundraising efforts. 7 ' Even more
worrisome, elected officials could become complacent regarding the
wishes of the large 527 soft money contributors. 179 The result would
be the appearance of a quid pro quo between elected officials and
527 soft money donors. The threat of actual or perceived corruption
provides the government with a compelling interest in closing a
campaign finance device that creates any incentive for officeholders
to provide special favors for soft money donors.
2. Preventing Circumvention of Federal Election Law
In McConnell, the Court determined that preventing circum-
vention of existing federal election law was a legitimate, compelling
sub=topindiv (last visited Sept. 17, 2005).
176. The IRS enables the public to search 527 disclosure reports online at http://forms.
irs.gov/politicalOrgsSearch/search/basicSearch.jsp (last visited Sept. 13, 2005), or the public
may download the entire database of 527 disclosure reports at http://forms.irs.gov/
politicalOrgsSearchlsearchldatadownload.jsp (last visited Sept. 13, 2005).
177. See Thomas B. Edsall & Dan Balz, GOP Backers Urged to Raise, Spend: FEC Ruling
Clears Way for Groups" 'Soft Money' Efforts, WASH. POST, May 15, 2004, at All ("[A] top
Texas official of the Bush campaign called on pro-Republican groups to aggressively raise and
spend as much as possible.'). Although there was no direct request from Senator Kerry's
campaign, it was widely reported in the press that Democrats were going to rely on 527s
funded by soft money to help Senator Kerry equalize President Bush's campaign's financial
prowess. See Balz & Edsall, supra note 10, at Al (reporting that the Democrats were
organizing 527s to "supplement the activities of Sen. John Kerry's campaign in the effort to
defeat President Bush").
178. See Thomas B. Edsall, Soft-Money Group Promotes Ties to GOP Leaders Despite
Warnings, WASH. POST, May 30, 2004, at A8. In a hurry to catch up with the millions in soft
money raised by pro-Democratic 527 organizations, Republican-leaning 527s began touting
their ties to prominent party leaders. One group sent out invitations highlighting the
appearance of House Speaker Dennis Hastert and Senator Rick Santorum at two different
events. Id.
179. For example, the wife of one of the two Texas developers who funded Republicans for
Clean Air in 2002 was appointed by President Bush to the John F. Kennedy Center Advisory
Committee on the Arts. Tobin, supra note 83, at 615 n.19 (citing 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DoC. 615 (Apr. 15, 2002)).
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government interest.18 ° This new legitimate government interest
was used to uphold provisions of BCRA banning national, state,
and local parties from raising soft money to influence federal
elections.8 1 Specifically, this interest justified Congress's restriction
of federal electioneering activities by state and local parties that
promote, attack, support, or oppose a federal candidate.8 2 Congress
was concerned "that donors and candidates, stymied by the other
soft money restrictions, would, unless prohibited, channel unre-
stricted donations to state and local candidates and officeholders to
be used for federal electioneering" activities.'83 The Court agreed
that the PASO standard, applied to state and local parties, was
"designed to preclude 'wholesale evasion' of [the national party ban]
by preventing state and local parties from becoming conduits for
soft money used to influence federal elections."'8 4
Stymied by the soft money ban on political parties, political
operatives turned to 527s to channel unrestricted donations toward
electioneering activities. 88 As the 2004 soft money contribution
levels show,8 6 § 527 was used to achieve wholesale evasion of the
federal hard money limits. Organized as shadow political parties,
these 527s raised soft money for the purpose of waging a full-scale
second campaign to influence the election outcome. 8 7 By the same
reasoning applied in McConnell, the government has a compelling
180. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 165-66, 185 (2003).
181. See id. at 161-66. Circumvention was also used by the court to uphold the
electioneering communication definition. Id. at 185.
182. Id. at 165-66.
183. Briffault, supra note 7, at 167.
184. Downie, supra note 146, at 932 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 161 n.53).
185. See Balz & Edsall, supra note 10; Dionne, supra note 129 (commenting on Harold
Ickes's idea to create a special 527 organization to raise money for ads directed at Bush, and
George Soros's and others' willingness to fund the new idea with soft money contributions);
Edsall, supra note 8 (reporting on the successful fundraising efforts of Republican-leaning
527s).
186. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
187. See Holman & Claybrook, supra note 43, at 251 ('The emergence of shadow parties
as electioneering non-profit groups waging a full-scale second campaign with non-profits
independent of the candidates, flies in the face of the principle of keeping campaign spending
down to reasonable levels."). The activities of 527s in the 2004 election were identical to the
activities the national parties funded with soft money prior to BCRA. Compare supra notes
52 and 130 with accompanying text.
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interest in stopping conduct that flies in the face of a principle of
election law. 188
Federal campaign finance law protects the health of the
American election system from unlimited campaign contributions
originating from a single source."' As evidenced by the 2004
elections, 527s are being used to circumvent the hard money limits
in federal campaign finance law. 9 ° This circumvention raises a
specter of corruption that undermines the integrity of the American
election system. Faced with the threat of circumvention and
corruption, the federal government has legitimate and compelling
interests to close the new 527 soft money loophole.
C. Functional Equivalents Prove Sufficiently Narrow
In McConnell, the Supreme Court held that if the election activity
the government seeks to regulate is the functional equivalent of
express advocacy, then the regulation is sufficiently tailored to the
compelling government interests and is not vague or overly broad.'9
This functional equivalent test was used by the Court to uphold
BCRA's electioneering communication definition.'92 The Court's test
has been summarized as follows: "[S]tatutes bordering on issue
advocacy that place any significant burden on issue advocacy must
(a) avoid vagueness by employing the express advocacy test or its
functional equivalent and (b) avoid overbreadth by targeting
express advocacy or by proving a functional equivalent .... 193
188. This is not to say that the 527 legislation discussed in this Note will block all soft
money contributions entering the election system. But it will provide the strongest limit on
the amount that enters the system. Soft money contributions will still be allowed in through
501(c)(4) organizations, but the amount will be capped by the organization's budget. See
supra note 89 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 12.
190. For example, twenty-five individual donors provided almost forty percent of the $380
million raised by 527 organizations. See Center for Responsive Politics, Contributors, supra
note 9 (listing twenty-five contributors of $2 million or greater that when totaled equal
$147,954,009).
191. See supra notes 149-53.
192. See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text. Due to the categorical approach taken
in defining electioneering communication, the new law encroached on issue advocacy and a
higher degree of review was used to uphold it.
193. Bopp & Coleson, supra note 143, at 301 (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 191-94, 205-
07).
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Applying this test to the definition, the Court held that electioneer-
ing communication was the functional equivalent of express
advocacy.194 The Court made this determination on the basis of a
legislative record that proved electioneering communication was the
functional equivalent of express advocacy. 195 Evidence from the
2004 election proves that 527 activities that promote, attack,
support, or oppose a federal candidate are the functional equivalent
of express advocacy.
1. Vagueness Avoided
Conduct that violates federal election law can result in criminal
liability for the actor.'96 Due process requires that no individual be
'held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not
reasonably understand to be proscribed. 1 97 Thus, due process
requires that federal election law avoid vagueness. Federal election
law is not vague when it "provide[s] adequate notice to a person of
ordinary intelligence that his contemplated conduct is illegal."' 98 In
Buckley, the Court held that express advocacy provided a person of
ordinary intelligence with adequate notice required by the Due
Process Clause to conform his conduct in accordance with election
law.'99 In McConnell, the majority held that electioneering commu-
nication was not vague because it was the functional equivalent of
express advocacy. 0 By being functionally equivalent, the statutory
language defining electioneering communication provided adequate
notice for a person of ordinary intelligence to conform his conduct
with the new election law.20 1
The McConnell majority reached its decision on the basis that
both terms contained a bright-line test for capturing certain
194. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 206 (2003).
195. Id. at 207; Bopp & Coleson, supra note 143, at 305-07.
196. See Kingsley & Pomeranz, supra note 81, at 113 ("FECA ... imposes criminal
penalties for violations.").
197. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 77 (1976) (citing United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612,
617 (1954)).
198. Id. at 77.
199. See id. at 44 (holding that express advocacy corrected FECA's vagueness problems).
200. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206.
201. See id. at 194.
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electioneering activities. 2 2 The bright-line test for express advocacy
is the use of magic words. The bright-line test for electioneering
communication is its definition of political speech. Political speech
is defined as a broadcast that clearly identifies a candidate for
federal office, airs within a specific time period, and targets an
identified audience of at least 50,000 viewers or listeners.2 °3 The
court concluded that, like the express advocacy test, the electioneer-
ing communication test was "both easily understood and objectively
determinable. 2 °4
The McConnell Court also upheld the PASO standard as not
vague when applied to state and local parties.2 5 The Court found
that the PASO 'terms provide[d] explicit standards for those
who apply them' and 'give the person of ordinary intelligence a
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited.' 26 The Court
continued by noting "[t] his is particularly the case ... [when] actions
taken by [state and local] political parties are presumed to be in
connection with election campaigns. ' '2° The basis behind the Court's
finding was "the political, and politically sophisticated, nature" of
the people involved-members and employees of the state and local
party.20 8
By this reasoning, the PASO standard could not be used to
regulate federal electioneering activities of non-527 organizations,
such as 501(c)(3) organizations. The vast majority of these organiza-
tions are not run by political sophisticates.2 9 Their very nature,
even existence, is predicated upon not influencing elections. If
applied to 501(c)(3) organizations, the PASO standard would fail
constitutionally because these organizations lack the political
202. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 143, at 302 ("ITihe electioneering communication
definition is very clear, providing a bright-line test as required of any statute bordering on
issue advocacy.").
203. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
204. Bopp & Coleson, supra note 143, at 301-02 (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 194).
205. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170 n.64.
206. Id.(quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972)).
207. Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976)). A similar presumption can be
made about 527 organizations. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
208. Bopp & Coleson, supra note 143, at 302 n.73.
209. See generally Kingsley & Pomeranz, supra note 81, at 60 (stating that the activities
of 501(c)(3) organizations "must be almost entirely educational, charitable, religious, or
scientific").
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sophistication required for the PASO terms to 'provide explicit
standards for those who apply them.' 21 °
Just like political parties, however, 527 organizations, by their
definition, are presumed to be connected to election campaigns.
They are organized for the primary purpose of influencing
elections.21' In fact, 527s are organized to win elections.212 For this
reason, many 527s are run by political operatives who gained
experience through involvement with political parties.213 By their
very nature and operation, 527s are political in nature and
politically sophisticated. Thus, the proposed legislation provides
527s with an explicit standard for complying with election law:
Does an electioneering activity promote, attack, support, or oppose
a federal candidate?
21 4
Activities by 527s that promote, attack, support, or oppose a
federal candidate are functionally equivalent to express advocacy.
Like express advocacy and electioneering communication, the 527
legislation creates a bright-line test: qualifying 527s that engage in
electioneering activities that promote, attack, support, or oppose a
federal candidate must comply with federal election law.21 '5 This
bright-line test enables ordinary political actors to conform their
federal election conduct accordingly. If they wish to engage in tax-
210. Bopp & Coleson, supra note 143, at 302 n.73 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170).
211. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
212. See Foley, supra note 134, at 345 (arguing that certain types of independent groups
"share an essential feature with political parties: they exist to win elections").
213. See Balz & Edsall, supra note 10; Hosenball, Isikoff & Bailey, supra note 2, at 26-27.
For example, Harold Ickes, the organizer of the major Democratic 527s, sat with the
Democratic National Committee's Executive Committee as of September 20, 2004. Id. at 27.
214. Even campaign finance reform advocates tracking the influence of 527s are able to
differentiate PASO and non-PASO activities by 527s. The Center for Public Integrity used
the following criteria to determine which of more than 20,000 527s to monitor. Their
methodology stated:
The committee is not required to report financial activities to state or federal
election authorities; [t]he committee is tied to or formed by a federal lawmaker;
and [tihe committee is active in many states and spends most of its money on
election-related activities like broadcast advertisements, mailings and political
research.
The Center for Public Integrity, Methodology, http://www.publicintegrity.org/527/default.
aspx?act=methodology (last visited Mar. 16, 2005). Their methodology, which is similar to
the 527 legislation, identified only 471 organizations that required monitoring. Of this
number, the Center for Public Integrity only found ninety-eight engaged in federal
electioneering activities. Center for Public Integrity, 527 Activity, supra note 8.
215. Qualifying 527s are 527s that do not meet the exceptions discussed supra note 136.
2005] 343
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
sheltered issue advocacy or federal electioneering activities without
being captured by election law, they can form a 501(c) orga-
nization.216 If they wish to obtain a tax shelter for activities with the
primary purpose of influencing federal elections, then they can form
a 527 organization and raise only hard money to influence the
outcome of a federal election.
2. Overbreadth Avoided
Federal election laws must not be overly broad. Laws are overly
broad when they restrict activities far in excess of those necessary
to achieve a compelling government interest.217 Election law can
avoid overbreadth concerns when the activity it seeks to capture is
the functional equivalent of express advocacy.21 "[F]unctional
equivalents must be proven by substantial evidence to implement
the same justifications underpinning the express advocacy test;
[]where there are facial determinations, the option of as-applied
challenges must be left open." '219
In determining whether electioneering communications were
functionally equivalent to express advocacy in McConnell, the Court
asked whether the purpose of electioneering communication was
the same as express advocacy: electioneering activities intended
to influence the voter's decisions and have that effect. 22° In other
words, was electioneering communication used for the same
purpose as express advocacy? The Court turned to the legislative
record to answer that question. The record contained evidence that
electioneering communication was "intended to influence the voters'
decisions and [had] that effect., 221 Thus, the Court held that
216. See supra text accompanying notes 86-90.
217. See Kingsley & Pomeranz, supra note 81, at 114 (discussing overbreadth concerns of
election law based on § 527).
218. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 143, at 304 ("iTihe McConnell analysis, done under
the rubric of Buckley ... still requires either the application of the express advocacy test or
its proven functional equivalent to eliminate overbreadth.").
219. Id. at 301 (citations omitted).
220. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 206 (2003) ('CThe justifications for
the regulation of express advocacy applied equally to [electioneering communications] ... if
the ads are intended to influence the voters' decisions and have that effect.").
221. See id. at 206 (relying on the record, the majority declared that "the vast majority of
ads clearly had such a purpose"); see also Briffault, supra note 7, at 156 (discussing the ease
with which the majority determined that preelection communication was functionally
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electioneering communication was functionally equivalent to
express advocacy because they served the same purpose. Whether
527 electioneering activities that promote, attack, support, or
oppose a federal candidate are functionally equivalent to express
advocacy will depend on whether they have the same purpose as
express advocacy-the intention to influence voter decisions and
have that effect.
Section 527 was used to funnel soft money into the election
system for the specific purpose of influencing voters by promoting,
attacking, supporting, or opposing federal candidates. The 527s
raised soft money that funded persuasive electioneering activities
that aimed "straight for the heart. 222 These public communications
produced an effect on voters' perception of the candidates. 23 The
2004 election activities by 527s that promoted, attacked, supported,
or opposed a federal candidate were intended to influence voters
and had that effect.
Both 527 electioneering activities that promote, attack, support,
or oppose a federal candidate and express advocacy serve the same
purpose and are functional equivalents. As discussed previously,
the framework of the proposed legislation is written such that only
527 activities that are functionally equivalent to express advocacy
are governed by the hard money limits.22 4 Activities by 527 organi-
zations that are not functionally equivalent are exempted or not
within the scope of the legislation.225 Therefore, facially, the 527 soft
money legislation avoids overbreadth concerns because the activity
it seeks to capture is the functional equivalent of an activity already
captured by election law. As required in McConnell, the option of
as-applied challenges remains open.
equivalent to express advocacy).
222. See Kurtz, supra note 5. The 527s "are saying things that the candidates dare not say,
connecting conspiratorial dots, using more disturbing images and indulging in no-holds-
barred ridicule.... [527 ads] yieldf a cacophony of themes tailored to different hot-button
issues, different constituencies, different states and different kinds of fears." Id.
223. See id.
224. See supra Part III.
225. See supra Part III.
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CONCLUSION
The 2004 election was defined and dominated by 527 political
organizations. These organizations operated outside the reach of the
federal hard money limits-limits the candidates themselves had
to follow. Free of the hard money limits, 527s raised million-dollar
contributions from individuals to influence the outcome of the 2004
election. To protect the integrity of the American election system,
reform is needed to curtail the corrupting effects of single-source
contributions that run into the millions of dollars. This reform can
be achieved by congressional legislation based on the basic frame-
work discussed in this Note. The 2004 experience provides Congress
with the compelling interest necessary to prevent the corrupting
influence of soft money funneled through 527 political organiza-
tions. As this Note demonstrated, 527s that promote, attack,
support, or oppose a federal candidate are functionally equivalent
to express advocacy. By passing legislation that only encompasses
the functional equivalent of express advocacy, Congress's means of
achieving its compelling interest will be sufficiently narrow to avoid
encroachment on freedom of speech. Thus, the basic framework is
constitutional and will survive judicial review. First Amendment
concerns should not be a barrier to institute the reforms needed to
close the 527 soft money loophole for future elections.
Jeffrey P. Geiger*
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